Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data

Charles I. Jones  Christopher Tonetti*  
Stanford GSB and NBER  Stanford GSB and NBER

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Abstract

Data is nonrival: a person’s location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by any number of firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns and implies an important role for market structure and property rights. Who should own data? What restrictions should apply to the use of data? We show that in equilibrium, firms may not adequately respect the privacy of consumers. But nonrivalry leads to other consequences that are less obvious. Because of nonrivalry, there may be large social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard data they own, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Instead, giving the data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data to all interested parties.

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1 Introduction

In recent years, the importance of data in the economy has become increasingly apparent. More powerful computers and advances in algorithms such as machine learning have led to an explosion in the usefulness of data. Examples include self-driving cars, real-time language translation, medical diagnoses, product recommendations, and social networks.

This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the economics of data. We are particularly interested in how different property rights for data determine its use in the economy, and thus affect output, privacy, and consumer welfare. The starting point for our analysis is the observation that data is nonrival. That is, at a technological level, data is infinitely usable. Most goods in economics are rival: if a person consumes a kilogram of rice or an hour of an accountant’s time, some resource with a positive opportunity cost is used up. In contrast, existing data can be used by any number of firms or people simultaneously, without being diminished. Consider a collection of a million labeled images, the human genome, the U.S. Census, or the data generated by 10,000 cars driving 10,000 miles. Any number of firms, people, or machine learning algorithms can use this data simultaneously without reducing the amount of data available to anyone else.

The key finding in our paper is that policies related to data have important economic consequences. When firms own data, they may not adequately respect the privacy of consumers. But nonrivalry leads to other consequences that are less obvious. Because data is nonrival, there are potentially large gains to data being used broadly. Markets for data provide financial incentives that promote broader use, but if selling data increases the rate of creative destruction, firms may hoard data in ways that are socially inefficient.

An analogy may be helpful. Because capital is rival, each firm must have its own building, each worker needs her own desk and computer, and each warehouse needs its own collection of forklifts. But if capital were nonrival, it would be as if every auto worker in the economy could use the entire industry’s stock of capital at the same time. Clearly this would produce tremendous economic gains. This is what is possible with data. Obviously there may be incentive reasons why it is inefficient to have all data used by all firms. But an equilibrium in which firms own data and sharply limit its use
by other firms may also be inefficient. Our numerical examples suggest that these costs can be large.

Another allocation we consider is one in which a government — perhaps out of concern for privacy — sharply limits the use of consumer data by firms. While this policy succeeds in generating privacy gains, it may potentially have an even larger cost because of the inefficiency that arises from a nonrival input not being used at the appropriate scale.

Finally, we consider an institutional arrangement in which consumers own the data associated with their behavior. Consumers then balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data to all interested parties. This equilibrium results in data being used broadly across firms, taking advantage of the nonrivalry of data. Across a wide range of parameter values explored in our numerical example, consumer ownership of data generates consumption and welfare that are substantially better than firm ownership.

To put this concretely, suppose doctors use software to help diagnose skin cancer. An algorithm can be trained using images of potential cancers labeled with pathology reports and cancer outcomes. Imagine a world in which hospitals own data and each uses labeled images from all patients in its network to train the algorithm. Now compare that to a situation in which competing algorithms can each use all the images from all patients in the United States, or even the world. The software based on larger samples could help doctors everywhere better treat patients and save lives. The gain to any single hospital from selling its data broadly may not be sufficient to generate the broad use that is beneficial to society, either because of concerns related to creative destruction or perhaps because of legal restrictions. Consumers owning their medical data and selling it to all interested researchers, hospitals, and entrepreneurs may result in a world closer to the social optimum in which such valuable data is used broadly to help many.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The introduction continues with a discussion of how we model data and on the similarities and differences between data and ideas — another nonrival good — and provides a literature review. Section 2 provides a simple model to demonstrate the link between nonrivalry and scale effects. Section 3 turns to the full model and presents the economic environment. Section 4
examines the allocation chosen by the social planner. Section 5 turns to a decentralized equilibrium in which firms own data and shows that it may be privately optimal for a firm to both overuse its own data and to sharply limit data sales to other firms. Section 6 instead considers an allocation in which consumers own data and, weighing privacy considerations, sell some of it to multiple firms. Section 7 shows what happens if the government outlaws the selling of data. Section 8 collects and discusses our main theoretical results while Section 9 presents a numerical simulation of our model to illustrate the various forces at work.

1.1 Data versus Ideas

We find it helpful to define information as the set of all economic goods that are nonrival. That is, information consists of economic goods that can be entirely represented as bit strings, i.e., as sequences of ones and zeros. Ideas and data are types of information. Following Romer (1990), an idea is a piece of information that is a set of instructions for making an economic good, which may include other ideas. Data denotes the remaining forms of information. It includes things like driving data, medical records, and location data that are not themselves instructions for making a good but that may still be useful in the production process, including in producing new ideas. An idea is a production function whereas data is a factor of production.

Some examples distinguishing data from ideas might be helpful. First, consider a million images of cats, rainbows, kids, buildings, etc., labeled with their main subject. Data like this is extremely useful for training machine learning algorithms, but these labeled images are clearly not themselves ideas, i.e., not blueprints. The same is true of the hourly heart-rate history of a thousand people or the speech samples of a population. It seems obvious at this level that data and ideas are distinct.

Second, consider the efforts to build a self-driving car. The essence is a machine learning algorithm, which can be thought of as a collection of nonlinear regressions attempting to forecast what actions an expert driver will take given the data from various sensors including cameras, lidar, GPS, and so on. Data in this example includes both the collection of sensor readings and the actions taken by expert drivers. The nonlinear regression estimates a large number of parameters to produce the best possible forecasts. A successful self-driving car algorithm — a computer program, and hence an
idea — is essentially just the forecasting rules that come from using data to estimate the parameters of the nonlinear model. The data and the idea are distinct: the software algorithm is the idea that is embedded in the self-driving cars of the future; data is an input used to produce this idea.

Another dimension along which ideas and data can differ is the extent to which they are excludable. On the one hand, it seems technologically easier to transmit data than to transmit ideas. Data can be sent at the press of button over the internet, whereas we invest many resources in education to learn ideas. On the other hand, data can be encrypted. Engineers change jobs and bring knowledge with them; people move and communicate causing ideas to diffuse, at least eventually. Data, in contrast, especially when it is “big,” may be more easily monitored and made to be highly excludable. The “idea” of machine learning is public, whereas the driving data that is fed into the machine learning algorithm is kept private; each firm is gathering its own data.

1.2 Relation to the Literature

The “economics of data” is a new but rapidly-growing field. In this paper we provide a macro perspective. Since we emphasize nonrivalry, there are parallels between how data appears in our model and how ideas appear in the growth literature. Compared to the growth literature, the most distinctive features of our model are

1. The use of nonrival goods: our setup features the simultaneous broad use of data by many firms; in Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) style models, each firm produces using a single idea.

2. The market for nonrival goods: our setup features markets through which each firm decides on a quantity of data to buy and sell; in idea-based models, typically the inventing firm produces itself or sells a single blueprint to a single monopoly producer.

3. Property rights: in idea-based models, property rights for ideas are always held by firms; in our setup, comparing consumer versus firm ownership of data is fundamental.

At the core of our analysis of decentralized equilibria is a market for data. This feature is related to the market for ideas in Akcigit et al. (2016). In their setup the idea is
used by only one firm at a time and the market helps to allocate the idea to the firm who could best make use of it. In contrast, our market for data allows multiple firms to use the nonrival good simultaneously. The literature on patent-licensing would be the closest to our paper since it studies legal arrangements under which multiple firms can use a given idea at the same time. From a more micro perspective, see Ali et al. (2019) who study the sale of nonrival information in a search and matching decentralized market and emphasize that nonrivalry generates inefficiency due to the under-utilization of information. Ichihashi (2019) studies competition among data intermediaries. Akcigit and Liu (2016) show in a growth context how the information that certain research paths lead to dead ends is socially valuable and how an economy may suffer from an inefficient duplication of research if this information is not shared across firms.

Given our macroeconomic perspective, we remain silent on many of the interesting related topics in industrial organization. Varian (2018) provides a general discussion of the economics of data and machine learning. He emphasizes that data is nonrival and refers to a common notion that “data is the new oil.” Varian notes that this nonrivalry means that “data access” may be more important than “data ownership” and suggests that while markets for data are relatively limited at this point, some types of data (like maps) are currently licensed by data providers to other firms. Our paper explores these and other insights in a formal model. Our results suggest that data ownership is likely to influence data access. In addition to thinking about property rights granted to firms who can sell their nonrival goods, we consider granting property rights to data to consumers. The fact that consumer interaction is necessary to create data in our setup makes the consumers-own-data property right regime a natural consideration, whereas the growth literature almost exclusively focuses on property rights granted to firms.

Data as a byproduct of economic activity also has analogues in the information economics literature. For example, see Veldkamp (2005), Ordonez (2013), Fajgelbaum et al. (2017), and Bergemann and Bonatti (2019). Arrieta Ibarra, Goff, Jimenez Hernandez, Lanier and Weyl (2018) and Posner and Weyl (2018) emphasize a “data as labor” perspective: data is a key input to many technology firms, and people may not be adequately compensated for the data they provide, perhaps because of market power considerations.
Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman (2016) discuss the economics of privacy and how consumers value the privacy of their data. In the context of medical records, Miller and Tucker (2017) find that approaches to privacy that give users control over redisclosure encourage the spread of genetic testing, consistent with the mechanism that we highlight in this paper. See Ali et al. (2018) who study consumer disclosure of personal information to firms and the consequent pricing and welfare implications. Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) highlight a tradeoff between privacy and the effectiveness of online advertising. Abowd and Schmutte (2019) emphasize that privacy isn't binary; there is an intensive margin to privacy with a choice of how much data to use. They propose a differential privacy framework to produce the socially optimal use of data that respects privacy concerns. Our paper features such an intensive margin of data use with corresponding tradeoffs.

Farboodi and Veldkamp (2019) is a paper complimentary to ours. We focus on property rights and how the associated sale and use of nonrival data can affect efficiency. They emphasize that data is information that can be used to reduce forecast errors, suggesting a production function with bounded returns to data. Our main point is that there can be large losses when a nonrival input is not used broadly. Most of our analysis focuses on a level effect, although there is also a growth effect in the edge case in which data sales are outlawed. We suspect that these level effects would survive even with bounded returns; our Cobb-Douglas specification is helpful for tractability. Farboodi and Veldkamp (2017) study the implications of expanding access to data for financial markets. Begenau, Farboodi and Veldkamp (2017) suggest that access to big data has lowered the cost of capital for large firms relative to small ones, leading to a rise in firm-size inequality.

Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian and Ozdaglar (2019) study privacy and data markets. They note that in some settings, data about me can reveal some characteristics about you. Under some circumstances, these externalities can cause data markets to break down and deliver both inefficiently low prices for data and inefficiently large privacy losses, as we both sell our data at low prices because we think the other person is selling anyway. We suspect that these problems can be substantial for some kinds of data, such as health or social media information, but smaller for other kinds of data, such as speech recognition or driving data (or whenever data can be adequately
Agrawal, Gans and Goldfarb (2018) provide an overview of the economics of machine learning. Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hortacsu and Suzuki (2018) examine how the amount of data impacts weekly retail sales forecasts for product categories at Amazon. They find that forecasts for a given product improve with the square-root of the number of weeks of data on that product. However, forecasts of sales for a given category do not seem to improve much as the number of products within the category grows. Azevedo, Deng, Montiel Olea, Rao and Weyl (2019) suggest that the distribution of outcomes in A/B testing in internet search may be fat-tailed: rare outcomes can have very high returns. Carriere-Swallow and Haksar (2019) note that credit bureaus are a long-standing market institution that facilitates the broad use of nonrival data, at least in one context. Hughes-Cromwick and Coronado (2019) view government data as a public good and study its value to U.S. businesses.

In order to emphasize the relationship between nonrivalry and scale effects and to study different property right regimes in a simple environment, our model omits some interesting features prevalent in the literature on data. In our model, data does not affect a firm's ability to discriminate against consumers via price or quantity. For example, we do not model firms that are able to learn the degree to which individuals are price sensitive or to refuse to sell insurance to people with high health risks. These considerations are important, so we view our paper as emphasizing an underappreciated channel relevant to the design of data property rights, but it does not provide a complete accounting of the pros and cons of the widespread availability and use of data.

A question that comes up immediately in this paper is why the Coase (1960) theorem does not apply: why does it matter whether firms or consumers own data initially? With trade and monetary transfers, why isn't the allocation the same in either case? One could certainly set up the model so that this would be true. However, to illustrate the importance of data sharing, we assume that the Coase theorem fails. In particular, we assume that consumers cannot commit to sell their data to only a single firm. Notice that this issue arises solely because of nonrivalry: a given apple can only be eaten once. This lack of commitment serves to illustrate various properties of an economy with data; similar assumptions are typically made in growth models with knowledge.
spillovers and creative destruction. How it plays out in the real world is a distinct and interesting question, but we simply note that there are many recent episodes in the news in which firms display a remarkable inability to avoid selling or using data that they have access to, often at odds with public statements on data-use policy, so this assumption — in addition to its pedagogical role — may actually have real-world relevance. Dosis and Sand-Zantman (2019) provide a micro-founded model of the failure of the Coase theorem in studying the property rights over the use of data. They emphasize that whether it is better for firms or consumers to own data depends on the overall value of the data to the firm and on the extent to which consumers can monetize their data. They do not consider the nonrivalry of data, however. See also Chari and Jones (2000) for some of the problems in implementing the Coase theorem in economies with public goods.

2 A Simple Model

Suppose the economy consists of \( N \) varieties. To be concrete, think of self-driving cars (e.g. Tesla, Uber, Waymo, and so on). Consumption of each variety combines in a CES fashion to produce a utility aggregate \( Y \), which we also think of as aggregate output. With symmetry, \( Y \) is given by

\[
Y = \left( \int_0^N Y_i^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \, di \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}} = N \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} Y_i.
\]

Variety \( i \) is produced by combining an idea of quality \( A_i \) and labor \( L_i \)

\[
Y_i = A_i L_i.
\]

The nonrival nature of ideas means there are constant returns to labor and increasing returns to labor and ideas together; this is the Romer (1990) insight that the nonrivalry of ideas gives rise to increasing returns.

Data is used to improve the quality of ideas:

\[
A_i = D_i^\eta.
\]
Intuitively, a given amount of data can be used to train a machine learning algorithm to help make cars safer. With a little data, this may allow the car to apply emergency braking when needed. A machine learning algorithm trained on even more data may be able to drive on highways and in bumper-to-bumper traffic. In other words, data can be viewed as improving the quality of an idea.

Importantly, a given amount of data trains a machine learning algorithm that can then be used in 1 car, 1000 cars, or 1 million cars simultaneously; this is the nonrivalry of the idea that is produced by the data. This is distinct from the nonrivalry of data, which will make its appearance shortly when we note that the same data can be used by many different firms to produce their own trained machine learning algorithms. The parameter $\eta$ will ultimately be a key determinant of the importance of data in the economy.

Putting these last two equations together,

$$Y_i = D_i^\eta L_i = D_i^\eta L/N = D_i^\eta \nu$$

where $L$ is the total amount of labor in the economy, allocated symmetrically across varieties, and $\nu \equiv L/N$ is firm size measured by employment.

Whenever a variety is consumed, it generates one piece of data: each mile driven generates data that raises the productivity of future trips. Data generated by Tesla cars is useful to Tesla. But data generated by Uber and Waymo could also potentially be useful to Tesla. We formalize this as

$$D_i = \alpha x Y_i + (1 - \alpha) B$$

$$= \alpha x Y_i + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x} \nu Y_i$$

$$= [\alpha x + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x} \nu] Y_i \quad (1)$$

In the first line, $Y_i$ is the amount of data generated by Tesla trips, and $x$ is the fraction of that data that Tesla is allowed to use. $B$ is the bundle of data from other varieties that Tesla — and every other firm — gets to use. The way this aggregate bundle $B$ enters firm $i$’s constraint in the first line is the most important feature of the model. This expression incorporates the key role of the nonrivalry of data: the bundle $B$ can be used by any number of firms simultaneously. The parameter $\alpha$ measures the importance of Tesla’s
own data relative to the data bundle from other firms.

The second line in this expression uses the fact that \( B \equiv \tilde{x}NY_i \). The quantity \( NY_i \) is the amount of data generated by Uber, Waymo, and the other varieties in the economy (because variety \( i \) is infinitesimal and because firms are symmetric), and \( \tilde{x} \) is the fraction of other firms’ data that Tesla gets to use. Both \( x \) and \( \tilde{x} \) are endogenous allocations in our richer model, chosen subject to privacy considerations. For now, though, we just treat them as parameters.

Substituting this expression for data back into variety \( i \)'s production function gives

\[
Y_i = ([\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)\tilde{x}N]^\eta \nu)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}.
\]

There is a multiplier associated with data. The more people consume your product, the more data you have. This raises productivity and generates more output and consumption and hence more data, completing the circle. The sum of this geometric series is \( \frac{1}{1-\eta} \), which is the key exponent in this production function.

Finally, substituting into the CES aggregator,

\[
Y = N^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} ([\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)\tilde{x}N]^\eta \nu)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}.
\]

Or, in terms of output per person \( y \equiv Y/L \):

\[
y = N^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} ([\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)\tilde{x}N]^\eta \nu)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}},
\]

where we’ve used \( L = \nu N \) on the right side.

Income per person in this economy depends on the number of firms in two ways. The first is through the traditional expanding variety effect, associated with the \( \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \) exponent, well-known since Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). What is new here is the second role of \( N \), entering through the data term and raised to the power \( \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} \). To understand this term, consider two allocations. In one, we prohibit the use of data by other firms by setting \( \tilde{x} = 0 \). In this case, each firm learns only from its own consumers. For the second case, suppose \( \tilde{x} > 0 \). In this case, each firm learns from every other firm in the industry: Tesla learns from the customers of Uber and Waymo as well as from its own customers. In this case, there is an additional scale effect: the more firms there are in
the economy, the more data is created, so the more Tesla is able to learn, which raises Tesla’s productivity.\(^1\) But every firm benefits similarly, and so overall output per person is higher. This is one of the basic insights of the paper: because data is nonrival, there are social gains to having data be used broadly instead of narrowly.

To highlight the key role of the nonrivalry of data, suppose data were a rival input instead of nonrival. That case can be thought of by setting \(1 - \alpha = 0\). The result of this is immediately given by the analysis above where we set \(\tilde{x} = 0\). In both cases — whether it is illegal for the same data to be used by multiple firms or whether it is technologically impossible — there is no scale effect associated with data.

The richer model we develop in the rest of the paper builds on this simple framework. We endogenize the number of firms by allowing for free entry, and we endogenize the allocation in the economy, including \(x\) and \(\tilde{x}\), by incorporating concerns for privacy into the utility function.

### Economic Environment

The economic environment that we work with throughout the paper builds on the simple model above and is summarized in Table 1. There is a representative consumer with log utility over per capita consumption, \(c_t\). There are \(N_t\) varieties of consumer goods that combine to enter utility with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator. There are \(L_t\) people in the economy and population grows exogenously at rate \(g_L\).

Privacy considerations also enter flow utility in two ways, as seen in equation (4). The first is via \(x_{it}\), which denotes the fraction of an individual’s data on consumption of variety \(i\) that is used by the firm producing that variety. The second is through \(\tilde{x}_{it}\), which denotes the fraction of an individual’s data on variety \(i\) that is used by other firms in the economy. For example, \(x_{it}\) could denote the fraction of data generated by Tesla drivers that is used by Tesla, while \(\tilde{x}_{it}\) is the fraction of that Tesla driving data that is used by Waymo and GM. Privacy costs enter via a quadratic loss function, where \(\kappa\) and \(\tilde{\kappa}\) capture the weight on privacy versus consumption. Because there are \(N_t\) varieties, we add up the privacy costs across all varieties and then assume the utility cost of privacy depends

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\(^1\)We are holding firm size \(\nu\) constant in this comparative static, which means \(L\) must be rising as \(N\) rises. This is exactly the source of the scale effect we are considering. In the full model, this is micro-founded through entry.
Table 1: The Economic Environment

Utility
\[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} L_t u(c_t, x_{it}, \tilde{x}_{it}) \, dt \] (3)

Flow Utility
\[ u(c_t, x_{it}, \tilde{x}_{it}) = \log c_t - \frac{\kappa}{2} \frac{1}{N_t^2} \int_0^{N_t} x_{it}^2 \, di - \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{2} \frac{1}{N_t} \int_0^{N_t} \tilde{x}_{it}^2 \, di \] (4)

Consumption per person
\[ c_t = \left( \int_0^{N_t} c_{it}^\sigma \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \text{ with } \sigma > 1 \] (5)

Data creation
\[ J_{it} = c_{it} L_t \] (6)

Variety resource constraint
\[ c_{it} = Y_{it} / L_t \] (7)

Firm production
\[ Y_{it} = D_{it}^\eta L_t \text{ with } \eta \in (0, 1) \] (8)

Data used by firm \( i \)
\[ D_{it} \leq \alpha x_{it} J_{it} + (1 - \alpha) B_t \text{ with } x_{it} \in [0, 1] \] (9)

Data on variety \( i \) shared with others
\[ D_{sit} = \tilde{x}_{it} J_{it} \text{ with } \tilde{x}_{it} \in [0, 1] \] (10)

Data bundle
\[ B_t = \left( N_t^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \int_0^{N_t} D_{sit}^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \text{ with } \epsilon > 1 \] (11)

Innovation (new varieties)
\[ \dot{N}_t = \frac{1}{\chi} \cdot L_{et} \] (12)

Labor resource constraint
\[ L_{et} + L_{pt} = L_t \text{ where } L_{pt} \equiv \int_0^{N_t} L_{it} \, di \] (13)

Population growth (exogenous)
\[ L_t = L_0 e^{g_{lt}} \] (14)

Aggregate output
\[ Y_t \equiv c_t L_t \] (15)

Creative destruction
\[ \delta(\tilde{x}_{it}) = \frac{\delta_0}{2} \tilde{x}_{it}^2 \] (16)
on the average. There is an additional $1/N_t$ scaling of the $x_{it}$ privacy cost. Because $\bar{x}_{it}$ reflects costs associated with data use by all other ($N_t$) firms in the economy, it is natural that there is a factor of $N_t$ difference between these costs, and this formulation generates interior solutions along the balanced growth path.

A simplifying assumption is that the unweighted average of $x_{it}$ and $\bar{x}_{it}$ enters utility. A more natural alternative would be to weight by the share of good $i$ in the consumption bundle. In the more natural case, consumers would be tempted to buy more of a variety from a firm that better respects privacy. Our unweighted average shuts down this force, which simplifies the algebra without changing the spirit of the model.

Where does data come from? Each unit of consumption is assumed to generate one unit of data as a byproduct. This is our “learning by doing” formulation and is captured in equation (6): $J_{it} = c_{it}L_t = Y_{it}$, where $J_{it}$ is data created about variety $i$.

Firm $i$ produces variety $i$ according to equation (8) in the table, just as in the simple model. Recall $Y_{it} = A_{it}L_{it}$ and $A_{it} = D_{it}^\eta$ and therefore

$$Y_{it} = D_{it}^\eta L_{it}, \text{ with } \eta \in (0, 1)$$

where $D_{it}$ is the amount of data used in producing the quality of variety $i$ and $L_{it}$ is labor. As before, the parameter $\eta$ captures the importance of data. We will show some evidence in Section 9 suggesting that $\eta$ might take a value of 0.03 to 0.10; we think of it as a small positive number.$^2$

Data used by firm $i$ is the sum of two terms:

$$D_{it} \leq \alpha x_{it} J_{it} + (1 - \alpha) B_t.$$  

The first term captures the amount of variety $i$ data that is used to help firm $i$ produce. In some of our allocations, firm $i$ will be able to use all the variety $i$ data — for example if firms own data. However, if consumers own data, they may restrict the amount of data that firms are able to use ($x_{it} < 1$). The second part of the equation incorporates data from other varieties that is used by firm $i$. Shared data on other varieties is aggregated into a bundle, $B_t$. For example, $x_{it} J_{it}$ is the data from Tesla drivers that Tesla gets to use while $B_t$ is the bundle of data from other self-driving car companies like Waymo, GM.

$^2$We require $\eta < 1/\sigma$. For firm size to be finite, the increasing returns from data must be smaller than the price elasticity with respect to size coming from CES demand.
and Uber that is also available to Tesla. The weights $\alpha$ and $1 - \alpha$ govern the importance of own versus others’ data. The way the aggregate bundle $B_t$ enters the individual firm’s constraint in equation (9) is the most important feature of the model. This expression incorporates the key role of the nonrivalry of data: the bundle $B_t$ can be used by any number of firms simultaneously; hence it does not have an $i$ subscript.

How is the bundle of data created? Let $D_{sit} \equiv \tilde{x}_{it}J_{it}$ denote the data about variety $i$ that is “shared” (hence the “s” subscript) and available for use by other firms to produce their varieties. Shared data is bundled together via a CES production function with elasticity of substitution $\epsilon$:

$$B_t = (N_t^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \int_0^{N_t} D_{sit}^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} dt)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}}.$$  

We divorce the returns to variety from the elasticity of substitution in this CES function using the method suggested by Benassy (1996). In particular, this formulation implies that $B$ will scale in direct proportion to $N$ and is given by $B = ND_{si}$ in the symmetric allocation, which simplifies the analysis.

For tractability, we set up the model so that data produced today is used to produce output today, i.e., roundabout production. We think of this as a within-period timing assumption. We also assume that data depreciates fully every period. These two assumptions imply that data is not a state variable, greatly simplifying the analysis.

The creation of new varieties is straightforward: $\chi$ units of labor are needed to create a new variety. Total labor used for entry, $L_{et}$, plus total labor used in production, $L_{pt}$, equals total labor available in the economy, $L_t$.

Equation (15) in Table 1 is simply a definition. Aggregate output in the economy, $Y_t$, equals aggregate consumption; there is no capital.

Notice that in our environment, ideas and data are well-defined and distinct. An idea is a blueprint for producing a distinct variety, and each new blueprint is created by $\chi$ units of labor. Data is a byproduct of consumption, and each time a good is consumed, one unit of data is created that is in turn useful for improving productivity, which can be thought of as the quality of the idea. A new idea is a new production function for producing a variety while data is a factor of production.

Finally, equation (16) is not actually part of the economic environment, but it is
an important feature of the economy. We’ve already mentioned one downside to the broad use of data — the privacy cost to individuals. Data sharing also increases the rate of creative destruction: ownership of variety $i$ changes according to a Poisson process with an arrival rate $\delta(\tilde{x}_{it})$. The more that competitors know about an incumbent firm, the greater the chance that the incumbent firm is displaced by an entrant. Since this is just a change in ownership, it is not part of the technology that constrains the planner.

**Discussion.** There are alternative assumptions we could make about our economic environment. For example, instead of having data be generated as a byproduct of consumption, we could instead assume firms have access to a separate production function for data ("learning or doing" instead of "learning by doing"). Both occur in the world: Tesla gathers data while people drive their cars, while Waymo sets up its own artificial towns in which they test-drive cars to generate data.

Second, economic growth ($g_L > 0$) is not necessary to make most of the main points of the paper; our results are almost entirely “level effects” rather than “growth effects” and would exist even with no aggregate growth. The presence of growth helps bring out the distinction between ideas and data and also simplifies the algebra.

Third, another way to simplify the algebra is to have the bundle of data combine with a firm’s own data using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator instead of our perfect substitutes approach. A further advantage of Cobb Douglas is that the $1 - \alpha$ parameter that captures the nonrivalry of data shows up explicitly in key places including the growth rate of the economy (see Appendix E.1). Given these advantages, future research may benefit from building on the Cobb-Douglas data aggregator case. The main downside—which was decisive for us—is that in the Cobb-Douglas case, the data bundle is essential and therefore we could not study laws that outlaw the selling of data.

Fourth, even without increasing returns to scale in the production of variety $i$, the nonrivalry of data matters. For example, if we modeled ideas as rival by modifying the production function to be $Y_{it} = D_{it}^{\eta}L_{it}^{1-\eta}$, the long-run growth rate of the economy would be unchanged (see Appendix E.2).

Fifth, we model privacy costs as a direct utility loss. We see this as a stand in for the many reasons people may not want firms to have their data. The main point of our paper is to highlight a way in which the broad use of data is beneficial, not to explore
the precise nature of privacy costs. We include them to show that even when privacy costs are large, our mechanism can still be quantitatively important.

Finally, our model assumes that all firms benefit from data equally and that each firm’s data is equally useful. In this sense, the model might more naturally be compared to a particular industry, such as radiology or autonomous cars. Output and welfare differences across property right regimes should therefore be interpreted as losses within an industry, most applicable for sectors in which data is an important input.

4 The Optimal Allocation

The optimal allocation in our environment is easy to define and characterize. Using symmetry, the production structure of the economy can be simplified considerably. Consumption per person is

\[ c_t = N_t^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} c_{it} = N_t^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \frac{Y_{it}}{L_t}. \]  

(17)

Moreover, the production of a variety is

\[ Y_{it} = D_{it}^{\eta} L_{it} = D_{it}^{\eta} \cdot \frac{L_{pt}}{N_t}. \]  

(18)

Combining these two expressions, aggregate output in the symmetric economy is

\[ Y_t = N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} D_{it}^{\eta} L_{pt}. \]  

(19)

Next, symmetry allows us to further simplify the data component:

\[
D_{it} = \alpha x_{it} Y_{it} + (1 - \alpha) N_t \tilde{x}_{it} Y_{it} \\
= [\alpha x_{it} + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{it} N_t] Y_{it}
\]  

(20)

This expression can be substituted into the production function for variety \( i \) in (18) to yield

\[ Y_{it} = \left( (\alpha x_{it} + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{it} N_t)^{\eta} L_{it} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}}. \]  

(21)
The increasing returns associated with data shows up in the $1/(1 - \eta)$ exponent. The term $\alpha x_{it} + (1 - \alpha)\bar{x}_{it} N_t$ will appear frequently. This derivation shows that the $\alpha x_{it}$ piece reflects firms using data from their own variety while the $(1 - \alpha)\bar{x}_{it} N_t$ piece reflects firms using data from other varieties. Moreover, when data is shared, this data term scales with the measure of varieties, $N_t$. This ultimately provides an extra scale effect associated with data nonrivalry.

Finally, substituting the expression for $D_{it}$ into the aggregate production function in (19) and using the symmetry conditions $L_{it} = L_{pt}/N_t$, $x_{it} = x_t$, and $\bar{x}_{it} = \bar{x}_t$ yields

$$Y_t = N_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\alpha x_t}{N_t} + (1 - \alpha)\bar{x}_t \right)^{\frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}} L_{pt}^{-\frac{1}{1 - \eta}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

This equation captures the two sources of increasing returns in our model. The $N_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$ is the standard increasing returns from love-of-variety associated with the nonrivalry of ideas. The $L_{pt}^{-\frac{1}{1 - \eta}}$ captures the increasing returns associated with data. In the optimal allocation, both play important roles.

We can now state the social planner problem concisely. The key allocations that need to be determined are how to allocate labor between production and entry and how much data to share. The optimal allocation solves

$$\max_{\{L_{pt}, x_t, \bar{x}_t\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\tilde{\rho} t} L_0 \left( \log c_t - \frac{\kappa}{2} N_t^2 \bar{x}_t^2 - \frac{\bar{x}_t^2}{2} \right) dt, \quad \tilde{\rho} \equiv \rho - g_L$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

s.t.

$$c_t = \frac{Y_t}{L_t}$$

$$Y_t = N_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\alpha x_t}{N_t} + (1 - \alpha)\bar{x}_t \right)^{\frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}} L_{pt}^{-\frac{1}{1 - \eta}}$$

$$\dot{N}_t = \frac{1}{\chi} (L_t - L_{pt})$$

$$L_t = L_0 e^{g_L t}$$

The planner wants to share variety $i$ data with firm $i$ because that increases productivity and output. Similarly, the planner wants to share variety $i$ data with other firms to take advantage of the nonrivalry of data, increasing the productivity and output of all firms. Tempering the planner’s desire for sharing are consumers’ privacy
concerns. Finally, the planner weighs the gains from new varieties against the gains from producing more of the existing varieties when allocating labor to production and entry. The optimal allocation is given in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1 (The Optimal Allocation):** Along a balanced growth path, as \( N_t \) grows large, the optimal allocation converges to

\[
\bar{x}_{it} = \bar{x}_{sp} = \left( \frac{1}{\kappa} \cdot \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1/2}
\]

\[
x_{it} = x_{sp} = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \cdot \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{\kappa} \left( \frac{1}{\kappa} \cdot \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1/2}
\]

\[
L_{sp}^i = \chi \cdot \sigma - 1 \equiv \nu_{sp}
\]

\[
N_{sp}^i = \frac{L_t}{\chi g_L + \nu_{sp}} \equiv \psi_{sp} L_t
\]

\[
L_{sp}^{pt} = \nu_{sp} \psi_{sp} L_t
\]

\[
Y_{sp}^i = \left[ \nu_{sp}(1 - \alpha)^{\eta} \bar{x}_{sp}^{\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \psi_{sp} L_t \right)^{-\frac{1}{1 - \eta} + \frac{1}{1 - \sigma}}
\]

\[
c_{sp}^i = \frac{Y_t}{L_t} = \left[ \nu_{sp}(1 - \alpha)^{\eta} \bar{x}_{sp}^{\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \psi_{sp}^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta} + \frac{1}{1 - \sigma}} L_t^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma} + \frac{1}{1 - \eta}}
\]

\[
g_{sp}^i = \left( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right) g_L
\]

\[
D_{sp}^i = \left[ (1 - \alpha) \bar{x}_{sp} \nu_{sp} \psi_{sp} L_t \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}}
\]

\[
D_{sp} = N D_i = \left[ (1 - \alpha) \bar{x}_{sp} \nu_{sp} \psi_{sp} L_t \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \psi_{sp} L_t \right)^{\frac{n}{1 - \eta}}
\]

\[
Y_{sp}^i = \left[ \nu_{sp}(1 - \alpha)^{\eta} \bar{x}_{sp}^{\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \psi_{sp} L_t \right)^{\frac{n}{1 - \eta}}
\]

\[
U_0 = \frac{1}{\tilde{\rho}} L_0 \left( \log c_0 - \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{2} \bar{x}_{sp}^2 + \frac{g_c}{\tilde{\rho}} \right)
\]

**Proof** See Appendix A.

The most important result in the proposition is the solution for aggregate output per person in equation (30). In particular, that solution shows that output per person is proportional to the size of the economy raised to some power. The exponent, \( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \), captures the degree of increasing returns to scale in the economy and is the sum of two terms. First is the standard “love of variety” effect that is smaller when varieties
are more substitutable. The second term is new and reflects the increasing returns associated with the nonrivalry of data. It is increasing in $\eta$, the importance of data to the economy. A larger economy is richer because it produces more data which then feeds back and makes all firms more productive. This equation also makes clear why we require $\eta < 1$; if $\eta \geq 1$, then the degree of increasing returns to scale is so large that the economy becomes infinitely rich: more output leads to more data, which leads to more output, and the virtuous circle explodes.

The next equation, (31), expresses the implications for growth: the growth rate of consumption per person, in the long run, is proportional to the growth rate of population, where the factor of proportionality is the degree of increasing returns to scale.

The remaining results in the optimal allocation break down in a simple way. First, optimal data sharing $\tilde{x}_{sp}$ and $x_{sp}$ are decreasing in the privacy costs ($\tilde{\kappa}$ and $\kappa$) and increasing in the importance of data in the economy ($\eta$), as shown in equations (24) and (25).

Next, equation (27) shows that optimal variety $N_{st}$ is proportional to the population in the economy, and the factor of proportionality is defined to be the parameter $\psi_{sp}$. Higher entry costs, a higher rate of time preference, and faster population growth all reduce variety along the balanced growth path. A higher elasticity of substitution between varieties makes new varieties less valuable and reduces $N_{st}$. Finally, if data is more important ($\uparrow \eta$) the economy devotes less resources to entry (which does not create data) and more resources to production (which does).

This is even more apparent in equation (26), which shows employment per firm, $L_{it}$, which equals a combination of parameters that we define to be $\nu_{sp}$. The comparative statics for firm size are essentially the opposite of those for variety. Optimal firm size is constant along a balanced growth path and invariant to the overall population of the economy. This reflects the assumption that the entry cost is a fixed amount of labor that does not change as the economy grows. The fact that the size distribution of firms seems stationary in the U.S. suggests this may be a reasonable assumption as Bollard, Klenow and Li (2016) document. We show later that the key findings of our paper are robust to variations of this assumption.

We will return to these results after discussing other ways to allocate resources in this environment. The $\nu$ and $\psi$ parameters for the different allocations will be an im-
important part of that comparison.

5  Firms Own Data

We now explore one possible way to use markets to allocate resources. In this equilibrium, we assume that firms own data and decide whether or not to sell it. Data is bought and sold via a data intermediary that bundles together data from all varieties and resells it to each individual firm. Throughout the paper, sellers of data always set prices if they have market power and buyers of data are always price takers.

5.1 Decision Problems

Household Problem. Households have one unit of labor that they supply inelastically in exchange for the wage $w_t$. They hold assets that pay a return $r_t$ (these assets are claims on the value of the monopolistically competitive firms). The representative household solves

$$U_0 = \max_{\{c_{it}\}} \int_0^\infty e^{-\bar{\rho}t} L_0 u(c_t, x_{it}, \bar{x}_{it}) \, dt$$

subject to

$$c_t = \left( \int_0^{N_t} c_{it} \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \, dt \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

$$\dot{a}_t = (r_t - g_L) a_t + w_t - \int_0^{N_t} p_{it} c_{it} \, dt$$

Notice that households do not choose how data is used or sold ($x_{it}$ and $\bar{x}_{it}$) since firms are the ones who own data in this allocation. The price of $c_t$ is normalized to one so that all prices are expressed in units of $c_t$.

Firm Problem. Each incumbent firm chooses how much data to buy and sell and how much labor to hire. Each sale generates data: $J_{it} = Y_{it}$. The firm uses the fraction $x_{it}$ of this data itself and sells a fraction $\bar{x}_{it}$ to the data intermediary at a price $p_{sit}$ that it sets via monopolistic competition. Because of nonrivalry, the firm can both use and sell the same data simultaneously. In addition, the firm buys bundles of data $D_{bit}$ at price $p_{bit}$, which it takes as given. Finally, each firm takes demand for its variety (aggregating the
FOC from the Household Problem) as given:

\[ p_{it} = \left( \frac{c_{it}}{v_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left( \frac{Y_{i}}{Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} . \]  

(39)

Recall our simplifying assumption that the \( x_{it} \) that enters the consumer’s utility function is an unweighted average, so that households do not demand more from a firm that uses or sells less of its data.

Letting \( V_{it} \) denote the market value of firm \( i \), the incumbent firm problem is:

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\{L_{it}, D_{bit}, x_{it}, \tilde{x}_{it}\}} & \left( \frac{Y_{i}}{Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} Y_{it} - w_{i} L_{it} - p_{bit} D_{bit} + p_{sit} \tilde{x}_{it} Y_{it} + \dot{V}_{it} - \delta(\tilde{x}_{it}) V_{it} \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad Y_{it} = D_{it}^{\sigma} L_{it} \\
& \quad D_{it} = \alpha x_{it} Y_{it} + (1 - \alpha) D_{bit} \\
& \quad x_{it} \in [0, 1], \quad \tilde{x}_{it} \in [0, 1] \\
& \quad p_{sit} = \lambda_{DI} N_{t}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{B_{t}}{\tilde{x}_{it} Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} 
\end{align*}
\]  

(40)

(41)

(42)

(43)

(44)

where the last equation is the downward-sloping demand curve for firm \( i \)'s data from the data intermediary, which is described next. Firm \( i \) takes the aggregates \( \lambda_{DI}, B_{t}, N_{t}, \) and \( Y_{i} \) as given in solving this problem.

Each firm wants to use all the data on its own variety: it owns the data already and does not consider consumers’ privacy concerns. The firm may also want to sell some of the data on its variety to other firms, but this desire is limited by the threat of creative destruction. When more information about the firm’s variety is available to competitors, the firm is more likely to be replaced by a competitor. The firm may want to buy some of the bundle of other firms’ data, weighing the cost of purchase against the gains from increased productivity and sales. Finally, the firm hires labor to reach its desired scale, recognizing the downward sloping demand curve for its variety as governed by the elasticity of substitution across varieties, \( \sigma \), and that more sales generates more data.

**Data Intermediary Problem.** The “b” and “s” notation for buying and selling becomes tricky with the data intermediary: \( D_{bit} \) is the amount that firm \( i \) buys from the data
intermediary, so it is the amount the data intermediary sells to firm $i$. Similarly, $p_{sit}$ is the price at which firm $i$ sells data to the data intermediary, so it is the price at which the data intermediary purchases data.

We originally hoped to model the data intermediary sector as perfectly competitive. However, the nonrival nature of data makes this impossible: if agents could buy nonrival data at a given price and then sell data at a given price, they would want to buy one unit and sell it an infinite number of times. Nonrivalry poses problems for perfect competition, as in Romer (1990).

Our alternative seeks to minimize frictions in data intermediation by treating the market for data as contestable. We assume that the data intermediary is a monopolist subject to free entry at a vanishingly small cost, so that the data intermediary earns zero profits. Moreover, we assume the actual and potential data intermediaries take the price at which they buy data from firms, $p_{sit}$, as given. This setup delivers a limit pricing condition with zero profits even though data is nonrival.

The data intermediary takes its purchase price of data $p_{sit}$ as given and maximizes profits by choosing the quantity of data to purchase from each firm and the price at which it sells bundles of data to firms:

$$\max_{\{p_{bt}, D_{sit}\}} p_{bt} \int_0^{N_{it}} D_{bit} \, di - \int_0^{N_{it}} p_{sit} D_{sit} \, di$$  \hspace{1cm} (45)

subject to the demand curve $p_{bt}(D_{bit})$ from the Firm Problem above, where $p_{bt}$ is the limit price associated with the zero profit condition that comes from free entry.

This expression for profits combined with the resource constraint on data in (46) incorporates the fact that the data intermediary can buy data once and sell it multiple times, i.e., the nonrivalry of data. This is shown in the first term of profits, where revenue essentially equals $N_{it}p_{bt}B_t$ — the firm is able to sell the same bundle $B_t$ multiple times. For example, location data from consumers can, technologically, be sold to every firm in the economy, not just to the store in which consumers happen to be shopping
at the moment.

**Firm Entry and the Creation of New Varieties.** A new variety can be designed and created at a fixed cost of $\chi$ units of labor. In addition, new entrants are the beneficiaries of business stealing: they obtain the property rights to the varieties that suffer from creative destruction.\(^3\) The free entry condition is then

$$\chi w_t = V_{it} + \int_0^{N_t} \delta(\tilde{x}_{it}) V_{it} \, di.$$  \(...(48)\)

The left side $\chi w_t$ is the cost of the $\chi$ units of labor needed to create a new variety. The right side has two terms. The first is the value of the new variety that is created. The second, is the per-entrant portion of the rents from creative destruction.

### 5.2 The Equilibrium when Firms Own Data

The equilibrium in which firms own data consists of quantities \(\{c_t, Y_t, c_{it}, x_{it}, \tilde{x}_{it}, a_t, Y_{it}, L_{it}, D_{it}, D_{bit}, B_t, D_{sit}, N_t, L_{pt}, L_{et}, L_t\}\) and prices \(\{p_{it}, p_{bit}, p_{sit}, w_t, r_t, V_{it}\}\) such that

1. \(\{c_t, c_{it}, a_t\}\) solve the Household Problem
2. \(\{L_{it}, Y_{it}, p_{it}, p_{sit}, D_{bit}, D_{it}, x_{it}, \tilde{x}_{it}, V_{it}\}\) solve the Firm Problem
3. \((D_{sit}, B_t)\) Data markets clear: $D_{bit} = B_t$ and $D_{sit} = \tilde{x}_{it} Y_{it}$
4. \((p_{bt})\) Free entry into data intermediation gives zero profits there (constrains $p_b$ as a function of $p_s$)
5. \((L_{et})\) Free entry into producing a new variety leads to zero profits, as in equation (48)
6. Definition of $L_{pt}$: $L_{pt} = \int_0^{N_t} L_{it} \, di$
7. $w_t$ clears the labor market: $L_{pt} + L_{et} = L_t$
8. $r_t$ clears the asset market: $a_t L_t = \int_0^{N_t} V_{it} \, di$

\(^3\)We could alternatively assume that existing firms get these benefits or that they are split in some proportion. How the rents from business stealing are assigned is not the main focus of our paper, and this assumption simplifies the analysis in the numerical exercise later. In particular, it acts as a subsidy to entry so that the equilibrium number of varieties is closer to optimal.
9. $N_t$ follows its law of motion: $\dot{N}_t = \frac{1}{\chi} (L_t - L_{pt})$

10. $Y_t \equiv c_t L_t$ denotes aggregate output

11. Exogenous population growth: $L_t = L_0 e^{\eta t}$

In Section 8, we compare this equilibrium allocation to the optimal allocation as well as to alternative allocations. Before that, we define the alternative allocations, allowing us to efficiently make the comparisons all at once. For this reason, we turn next to an equilibrium in which consumers own data.

### 6 Consumers Own Data

We now consider an allocation in which consumers own data associated with their purchases. They can sell data to a data intermediary and choose how much data to sell to balance the gain in income versus the cost to privacy. Firms own zero data as it is created but can purchase data from the data intermediary. As we discussed earlier, consumers cannot commit to sell their data to only a single firm. Thus, it is not possible for firm $i$ to charge consumers a lower price in exchange for the consumers agreeing not to sell their data to others.

Why is this departure from the Coase theorem helpful? Motivated by concerns about creative destruction, firm $i$ would like to strike a deal with consumers: we will pay you for exclusive access to your data. At the right price, individual consumers would accept, and firms would be better off. But this would reproduce the “firms own data” allocation that limits data sales. Instead, we assume here that such deals cannot be struck (for example, either because of a law that prohibits exclusive contracts or because of a commitment problem). This allows us to study an equilibrium in which data is used more widely across firms.

#### 6.1 Decision Problems

**Household Problem.** The household problem is similar to when firms own data, except now the household chooses how much data to sell. Consumers license the same data in two ways when selling it: they sell data on variety $i$ with a license that allows firm $i$ to use it and, separately, they sell data on variety $i$ with a license that allows it to
be bundled and sold to all other firms. Because data can be sold in two ways, there are
two different prices, which consumers take as given: data on variety \( i \) that will be used
only by firm \( i \) sells at price \( p_{a}^{i} \), while data on variety \( i \) that can be bundled and sold to
any firm sells at price \( p_{b}^{i} \). The representative household solves

\[
U_{0} = \max_{\{c_{t}, x_{t}, \tilde{x}_{t}\}} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\tilde{\rho}t} L_{0} u(c_{t}, x_{t}, \tilde{x}_{t}) \, dt
\]

s.t.  \( c_{t} = \left( \int_{0}^{N_{t}} \frac{\sigma-1}{c_{it}^{\sigma}} \, dt \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \) (49)

\[
\dot{a}_{t} = (r_{t} - g_{L})a_{t} + w_{t} - \int_{0}^{N_{t}} p_{it}c_{it} \, dt + \int_{0}^{N_{t}} x_{it}p_{ast}^{a}c_{it} \, dt + \int_{0}^{N_{t}} \tilde{x}_{it}p_{bst}^{b}c_{it} \, dt
\]

\[
= (r_{t} - g_{L})a_{t} + w_{t} - \int_{0}^{N_{t}} q_{it}c_{it} \, dt
\]

where \( q_{it} \equiv p_{it} - x_{it}p_{ast}^{a} - \tilde{x}_{it}p_{bst}^{b} \) is the effective price of consumption, taking into ac-
count that the fractions \( x_{it} \) and \( \tilde{x}_{it} \) of each good consumed generate income when the
associated data is sold.

**Firm Problem.** Each incumbent firm chooses how much data to buy. Two types of
data are available for purchase: data from the firm’s own variety \( D_{ait} \) and data from
other varieties \( D_{bit} \). Each firm sees the downward-sloping demand for its variety
(aggregating the FOC from the Household Problem):

\[
q_{it} = \left( \frac{c_{t}}{c_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \left( \frac{Y_{t}}{Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = p_{it} - x_{it}p_{ast}^{a} - \tilde{x}_{it}p_{bst}^{b}
\]

so that

\[
p_{it} = \left( \frac{Y_{t}}{Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} + x_{it}p_{ast}^{a} + \tilde{x}_{it}p_{bst}^{b}.
\]

Letting \( V_{it} \) denote the market value of firm \( i \), the incumbent firm problem is:

\[
r_{t}V_{it} = \max_{L_{it}, D_{ait}, D_{bit}} \left[ \left( \frac{Y_{t}}{Y_{it}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} + x_{it}p_{ast}^{a} + \tilde{x}_{it}p_{bst}^{b} \right] \left( Y_{it} - w_{t}L_{it} - p_{at}D_{ait} - p_{bt}D_{bit} \right) + \tilde{V}_{it} - \delta(\tilde{x}_{it})V_{it}
\]

s.t.  \( Y_{it} = D_{it}^{h}L_{it} \) (54)
\[ D_{it} = \alpha D_{ait} + (1 - \alpha) D_{bit} \]  
\[ D_{ait} \geq 0, \ D_{bit} \geq 0 \]  

Firms no longer face a simple constant elasticity demand curve because the effective price that consumers pay is different from the price that firms receive (because consumers sell data). From the perspective of the firm, \( D_{ait} \) and \( D_{bit} \) are perfect substitutes: the firm is indifferent between using its own data versus an appropriately-sized bundle of other firms’ data.

**Data Intermediary Problem.** Because we have two types of data, we now introduce two different data intermediaries: one handles the sale of “own” data and the other handles the bundle. Each is modeled as earlier, i.e., as a monopolist who is constrained by free entry into data intermediation.

Taking the price \( p^a_{ait} \) of data purchased from consumers as given, the data intermediary for own data solves the following problem at each date \( t \):

\[
\max \left\{ p_{ait} D_{ait} \right\} \int_0^{N_t} p_{ait} D_{ait} \, di - \int_0^{N_t} p^a_{ait} D^a_{cit} \, di \\
\text{s.t.} \quad D_{ait} \leq D^a_{cit} \quad \forall i \\
p_{ait} \leq p^*_a{ait} \quad (58)
\]

subject to the demand curve \( p_{ait}(D_{ait}) \) from the Firm Problem above, where \( p^*_a{ait} \) is the limit price associated with the zero profit condition that comes from free entry.

Similarly, taking the price \( p^b_{bit} \) of data purchased from consumers as given, the data intermediary for bundled data solves

\[
\max \left\{ p_{bit} D_{bit} \right\} \int_0^{N_t} p_{bit} D_{bit} \, di - \int_0^{N_t} p^b_{bit} D^b_{cit} \, di \\
\text{s.t.} \quad D_{bit} \leq B_t = \left( N_{\tau}^{-\frac{1}{\tau}} \int_0^{N_t} (D^b_{cit} \tau) \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{\tau-1}} \quad \forall i \\
p_{bit} \leq p^*_b{bit} \quad (61)
\]
subject to the demand curve $p_{\text{bit}} (D_{\text{bit}})$ from the Firm Problem above, where $p^*_{\text{bit}}$ is the limit price associated with the zero profit condition that comes from free entry.

The two data intermediaries are monopolists who choose the prices $p_{\text{ait}}$ and $p_{\text{bit}}$ of data as well as how much data to buy from consumers of each variety and type, taking the prices $p_{\text{a}}$ and $p_{\text{b}}$ as given. From the standpoint of the consumer, one unit of consumption generates one unit of data and data from all varieties sell at the same price, while each type of license may sell at a different price.

The constraints on the data intermediary problems are critical. Equation (57) says that the largest amount of own data the intermediary can sell to firm $i$ is the amount of variety $i$ data that the data intermediary has purchased. In contrast, equation (60) recognizes that data from all varieties can be bundled together and resold to each individual firm.

Zero profits from free entry into data intermediation together with the fact that the two types of data are perfect substitutes in the firm production function pin down the prices $p_{\text{a}}$ and $p_{\text{b}}$.

### 6.2 Equilibrium when Consumers Own Data

An equilibrium in which consumers own data consists of quantities \{$c_t, Y_t, c_{it}, x_{it}, \bar{x}_{it}, a_t, Y_{it}, L_{it}, D_{ait}, D_{bit}, D^a_{cit}, D^b_{cit}, B_t, N_t, L_{pt}, L_{et}, L_t$\} and prices \{$q_{it}, p_{it}, p_{a_{it}}, p_{b_{it}}, p^a_{st}, p^b_{st}, w_t, r_t, V_{it}$\} such that

1. \{$c_t, c_{it}, x_{it}, \bar{x}_{it}, a_t$\} solve the Household Problem
2. \{$L_{it}, Y_{it}, p_{it}, D_{ait}, D_{bit}, D_{it}, V_{it}$\} solve the Firm Problem
3. (\$q_{it}\$) The effective consumer price is $q_{it} = p_{it} - x_{it}p^a_{st} - \bar{x}_{it}p^b_{st}$
4. \(D^a_{cit}, D^b_{cit}, B_t, p_{a_{it}}, \text{ and } p_{b_{it}}\) solve the Data Intermediary Problem subject to the constraint that there is free entry into this sector, so it makes zero profits
5. \(p^a_{st}\) clears the data market so that supply equals demand: $D^a_{cit} = x_{it}c_{it}L_t$
6. \(p^b_{st}\) clears the data market so that supply equals demand: $D^b_{cit} = \bar{x}_{it}c_{it}L_t$
7. (\$L_{et}\$) Free entry into producing a new variety leads to zero profits (including the entrant’s share of the rents from creative destruction): $\chi w_t = V_{it} + \int_0^{N_t} \delta(\bar{x}_{it})V_{it} \, di$
8. Definition of $L_{pt}$: $L_{pt} = \int_{0}^{N_t} L_{it} \, di$

9. $w_t$ clears the labor market: $L_{pt} + L_{et} = L_t$

10. $r_t$ clears the asset market: $a_t L_t = \int_{0}^{N_t} V_{it} \, di$

11. $N_t$ follows its law of motion: $\dot{N}_t = \frac{1}{\chi} (L_t - L_{pt})$

12. $Y_t \equiv c_t L_t$ denotes aggregate output

13. Exogenous population growth: $L_t = L_0 e^{\gamma L_t}$

6.3 Understanding the Equilibrium when Consumers Own Data

While Section 8 will discuss the key features of this allocation, it is worth pausing here to highlight some smaller results.

First, because own data and the bundle of other-variety data are perfect substitutes (see equation (55)), in equilibrium

\[ p_{at} = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} p_{bt} \] (62)

where we’ve dropped the $i$ subscript because of symmetry. At any other price ratio, firms would buy only one type of data and not the other. Similarly, the consumer prices for each type of data satisfy

\[ p_{st}^a = p_{at} \quad \text{and} \quad p_{st}^b = N_t p_{bt}. \] (63)

Second, consider the inequality constraints in the Data Intermediary problems. In equilibrium, the data intermediary will sell any data that it buys. Moreover, because of nonrivalry, data can be bought once and sold multiple times. This means that both inequality constraints will bind. First, $D_{ait} = D_{cit}^a = x_{it} Y_{it}$; that is, all data on variety $i$ that the data intermediary purchases will be sold to firm $i$. Second, $D_{bit} = B_t = N D_{cit}^b = N \tilde{x}_{it} Y_{it}$ (using symmetry); that is, all data that is licensed for sharing that the data intermediary buys will be sold to all firms as bundled data.
7 Outlaw Data Sales

The final allocation that we consider is motivated by recent concerns over data privacy. In the world in which firms own data, suppose the government, in an effort to protect privacy, limits the use of data. In particular, it mandates that

\[
\tilde{x}_{it} = 0 \\
x_{it} \leq \bar{x} \in (0, 1].
\]

That is, firms are not allowed to sell their data to any third parties: \(\tilde{x}_{it} = 0\). A similar allocation without the broad use of data may arise from an opt-out law that grants consumers the right to prevent firms from selling their data, since there are privacy costs to the consumer and no counteracting direct income gain. Moreover, the government may restrict firms to use less than 100 percent of their own-variety data, parameterized by \(x_{it} = \bar{x}\). We require \(\bar{x} > 0\) in our setting — otherwise output of each firm would be zero because data is an essential input to production.

With this determination of \(\tilde{x}_{it}\) and \(x_{it}\), the rest of the equilibrium looks exactly like the firms-own-data case, so we will not repeat that setup here. Instead, we turn next to comparing the equilibrium outcomes across these different allocations.

8 Key Insights from Comparing the Different Allocations

This section delivers the payoff from the preparation we’ve made in the previous sections: we see how the different allocation mechanisms we’ve studied lead to different outcomes. We compare the allocations on the balanced growth path for the social planner (\(sp\)), when consumers own data (\(c\)), when firms own data (\(f\)), and when the government outlaws the selling of data (\(os\)). When firms restrict the sale of data to limit their exposure to creative destruction, what are the consequences? When consumers own data and can sell it, is the allocation optimal? What if selling data is banned out of a concern for privacy?
Privacy and Data Sales. The steady-state fraction of data that is used by other firms is given by

\begin{align}
\tilde{x}_{sp} &= \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{\kappa}} \cdot \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^{1/2} \\
\tilde{x}_c &= \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{\kappa}} \cdot \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \right)^{1/2} \\
\tilde{x}_f &= \left( \frac{2\Gamma \rho}{(2 - \Gamma)\delta_0} \right)^{1/2} \text{ where } \Gamma = \frac{\eta(\sigma - 1)}{\epsilon - \sigma \eta} \\
\tilde{x}_{os} &= 0.
\end{align}

Interestingly, even when consumers own and sell their data, the equilibrium allocation features inefficiently low data sales because of the $\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} < 1$ term in equation (65). The equilibrium price of data that consumers receive in exchange for selling is influenced by this same factor:

\[ p^b_{st} = \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \cdot \frac{1}{\tilde{x}_c} (\psi_c L_i)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \]

Recall that $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}$ is the standard monopoly markup in the goods market, so the intuition is that the monopoly markup distortion leads data to sell for a price that is inefficiently low, causing consumers to sell too little data.

The strong similarity between the consumer and optimal $\tilde{x}$ can be contrasted with data sales when firms own data, given in equation (66). First, the utility cost associated with privacy $\tilde{\kappa}$ does not enter the firm solution, as firms do not inherently care about privacy. Second, $\tilde{x}_f$ depends on $\delta_0$, capturing the crucial role of creative destruction — which does not enter the planner or consumer solutions for $\tilde{x}$. As we will see in our numerical examples, reasonable values for $\delta_0$ mean that creative destruction concerns are first-order for firms, so they may sell little data to other firms and choose a small $\tilde{x}_f$. Thus, firms inadvertently deliver privacy benefits to consumers. But as we will see, this aversion to selling data has other consequences. An extreme version of this allocation is the one that outlaws data sales entirely, so that $\tilde{x}_{os} = 0$.

The privacy considerations that involve only firm $i$ and consumption of variety $i$ are

\footnote{We assume $\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1} > \sigma \eta$ and $\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1} > \frac{3}{2} \sigma \eta - \frac{1}{2} \eta$ so that $\Gamma \in (0, 2)$ holds in equation (66).}
similar. In particular,

\[ x_{sp} = \frac{\alpha \tilde{\kappa}}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{\kappa} \tilde{\kappa}} \cdot \tilde{x}_{sp} \quad (68) \]
\[ x_{c} = \frac{\alpha \tilde{\kappa}}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{\kappa} \tilde{\kappa}} \cdot \tilde{x}_{c} \quad (69) \]
\[ x_{f} = 1 \quad (70) \]
\[ x_{os} = \bar{x} \in (0, 1]. \quad (71) \]

These equations show that when firms own data, they overuse it. That is, firms set \( x_{f} = 1 \), while the social planner and consumers take into account the privacy costs associated with \( \kappa \) and generally choose less direct use of data, \( x_{c} < x_{sp} < 1 \).

**Firm Size.** Because of symmetry, firm size \( L_{it} \) equals the ratio of production employment to varieties, \( L_{pt}/N_{t} \). This quantity plays an important role in all of the allocations and is denoted by the parameter \( \nu \):

\[ L_{it}^{alloc} = \left( \frac{L_{pt}}{N_{t}} \right)^{alloc} \equiv \nu_{alloc}, \quad \text{for } alloc \in \{sp, c, f, os\} \quad (72) \]

where

\[ \nu_{sp} \equiv \chi_{p} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \eta} \quad (73) \]
\[ \nu_{c} \equiv \chi_{GL} \cdot \frac{\rho + \delta(\tilde{x}_{c})}{g_{L} + \delta(\tilde{x}_{c})} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \sigma \eta} \quad (74) \]
\[ \nu_{f} \equiv \chi_{GL} \cdot \frac{\rho + \delta(\tilde{x}_{f})}{g_{L} + \delta(\tilde{x}_{f})} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \sigma \eta \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} \quad (75) \]
\[ \nu_{os} \equiv \chi_{p} \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 - \sigma \eta}. \quad (76) \]

For all allocations, firm size as measured by employees is constant. This is because the entry cost technology is such that a fixed number of workers can create a new variety. Several economic forces determine firm size. First, notice how similar \( \nu_{sp} \) and \( \nu_{os} \) are. That is, steady-state firm size in the allocation with no data sales features a firm size that looks superficially similar to the optimal firm size. Both are increasing in \( \chi \) (the entry cost) and \( \rho \) (the rate of time preference). Higher values of these parameters deter entry, and since the two uses for labor are entry and production, this increases
labor used in production.

The only difference between the two expressions is that the optimal firm size depends on $1 - \eta$ where the equilibrium firm size depends on $1 - \sigma \eta$. This difference is subtle and important to understand, as this same difference plays an important role throughout the allocations. Ultimately, this wedge results from the standard appropriability problem, that the profit earned by creating a new variety is less than the social surplus. To understand this difference in detail, we rewrite the optimal allocation as

$$\left( \frac{L_{pt}}{N_t} \right)^{sp} = \nu_{sp} = Const \cdot \frac{1/(1 - \eta)}{1/(\sigma - 1)}. \quad (77)$$

The left-hand side of this expression is the ratio of production labor to the amount of varieties, and variety is closely related to entry. The right-hand side is the ratio of two elasticities. The numerator, $1/(1 - \eta)$, is the degree of increasing returns to scale at the firm level that results from the nonrivalry of data. The denominator, $1/(\sigma - 1)$, is the degree of increasing returns to scale associated with the love of variety. The planner makes the ratio of production labor to the amount of varieties proportional to the ratio of these two elasticities, which capture the social value of production labor and entry.

In contrast, consider the equilibrium allocation when selling data is outlawed. Flipping the numerator and denominator, equation (76) can be expressed as

$$\left( \frac{N_t}{L_{pt}} \right)^{os} = \frac{1}{\nu_{os}} = Const \cdot \frac{1 - \sigma \eta}{\sigma - 1}. \quad (78)$$

As shown in Appendix equation (A.73), this expression derives from the equilibrium free entry condition. The number of firms in the economy, $N_t$, depends on profits earned after entry relative to entry costs. Aggregate profits as a share of aggregate output equals $(1 - \sigma \eta)/\sigma \cdot 1/(1 - \eta)$, while aggregate payments to production labor as a share of output equals $(\sigma - 1)/\sigma \cdot 1/(1 - \eta)$. Equation (78) says that the equilibrium amount of varieties is proportional to this ratio.

Equations (73) and (76) imply that firm employment is larger in the equilibrium with no data sales than in the optimal allocation since $\sigma > 1$. This occurs because of the profit share term. Intuitively, the equilibrium allocation creates varieties based on profits, while the social planner creates varieties based on the full social surplus. Because of the standard appropriability problem, the outlaw-sales equilibrium features
too few firms. The flip side is that firms in equilibrium are inefficiently large.

Going even further, the nonrivalry of data is essential to generating a wedge between equilibrium and optimal entry. If \( \alpha = 1 \) such that data were rival, then equilibrium entry and firm size would be optimal for all property right regimes.

We will discuss the equations for \( \nu_c \) and \( \nu_f \) after considering the number of firms and varieties, next.

**Number of Firms and Varieties.** The effect of the appropriability problem on the measure of varieties can be seen more directly in our next set of equations. The number of firms (varieties) in an allocation is proportional to the labor force:

\[
N_{t}^{\text{alloc}} = \psi_{\text{alloc}} L_t \quad \text{where} \quad \psi_{\text{alloc}} \equiv \frac{1}{\chi g_L + \nu_{\text{alloc}}}. \tag{79}
\]

Notice that the last half of the denominator of the \( \psi \) expression is just the \( \nu \) term itself. For \( g_L \) small, variety is basically inversely proportional to firm size, verifying intuition provided above about firm size and variety.

Next, we compare firm size and variety between the equilibrium in which consumers own data and the outlaw-sales equilibrium in which firms own data. Equations (74) and (76) show that firm sizes differ in these two allocations only because of creative destruction, which enters in two ways. In the numerator of (74), there is a \( \rho + \delta(\tilde{x}_c) \) term. This captures the extent to which creative destruction raises the effective rate at which firms discount future profits. In the denominator, however, there is an additional term involving \( \delta(\tilde{x}_c) \). This term captures the rents from destroyed firms as they flow to new entrants — business stealing — essentially raising the return to entry. If \( \rho = g_L \), then these two terms cancel and creative destruction does not influence firm size and variety creation.

A similar effect impacts firm size and the number of firms in the equilibrium when firms own data and can legally buy and sell it, as seen in equation (75). However, in that allocation, data sales are typically lower than when consumers own data, implying that creative destruction is also lower, reducing the role of this term.

**Aggregate Output and Economic Growth.** The key finding of the paper is how data use influences living standards. The next set of equations shows aggregate output in
the various allocations. For the allocations that feature some data sharing, the equation for aggregate output is

\[ Y_{t}^{\text{alloc}} = \left[ \nu_{\text{alloc}}(1 - \alpha)^{\eta} \tilde{x}_{\text{alloc}}^{\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \psi_{\text{alloc}} L_t \right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta}} \text{ for } \text{alloc} \in \{ \text{sp, c, f} \}. \] (80)

There are essentially three key terms in this expression, and all have a clear interpretation. First, \( \nu_{\text{alloc}} \) captures the size of each individual firm, and it is raised to the power \( \frac{1}{1 - \eta} \) because of the increasing returns to scale at the firm level associated with data. Second, the term \( (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{\text{alloc}} \) captures data. In particular, recall (e.g., from equation (33)) that

\[ D_{it} = \left[ \alpha x_{it} + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{it} N_t \right] Y_{it} = N_t \left[ \frac{\alpha x_{it}}{N_t} + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{it} \right] Y_{it}. \] (81)

As \( N_t \) grows large, the own use term \( \alpha x_{it}/N_t \) disappears, and data is ultimately proportional to \( (1 - \alpha) \tilde{x}_{\text{alloc}} \). This is raised to the power \( \eta \) because of the usual \( D_{it}^{\eta} \) term in the production function for output, and it is further raised to the power \( 1/(1 - \eta) \) because of the feedback effect through \( Y_{it} \). Finally, the last term in equation (80) is \( N_t = \psi_{\text{alloc}} L_t \) raised to the power \( 1 + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \). This exponent captures the overall degree of increasing returns to scale in the economy: \( 1/(\sigma - 1) \) comes from the standard variety effect associated with the nonrivalry of ideas while \( \eta/(1 - \eta) \) comes from the extra degree of increasing returns associated with the nonrivalry of data. This last effect enters directly because of the \( N_t \) term associated with broad data use in (81) that we just discussed.

Aggregate output when there is some data sharing can be contrasted with output when selling data is outlawed:

\[ Y_{t}^{\text{os}} = \left[ \nu_{\text{os}} \alpha^{\eta} x_{\text{os}}^{\eta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \eta}} \left( \psi_{\text{os}} L_t \right)^{1 + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \] (82)

Two main differences stand out. The first is related to the \( \nu \) and \( \psi \) terms and the differences in the allocations in these two economies. But the second is perhaps surprising and potentially even more important: there is a fundamental difference in the role of scale between the allocations that involve data sharing and the outlaw-sales equilibrium. In the allocations with broad data use, the exponent on \( L_t \) is \( 1 + \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \), while
in the outlaw-sales equilibrium, the additional returns associated with broad data use
\( \eta \) \( \frac{1}{1-\eta} \) are absent. The reason for this can be seen directly in equation (81) above: when
\( \bar{x} = 0 \), the additional scale term associated with \((1 - \alpha)\bar{x}N_t\) disappears and the amount
of data just depends on \( \alpha x_{os} \). That is, firms learn only from their own production and
not from the \( N_t \) other firms in the economy.

The results for per capita income illustrate this even more clearly. In this economy,
consumption per person equals output per person, \( Y_t / L_t \). Dividing the equations above
by \( L_t \) gives

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_t^{alloc} & \propto L_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma} + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \quad \text{for } alloc \in \{ sp, c, f \} \\
\epsilon_t^{os} & \propto L_t^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.
\end{align*}
\]

This effect can be seen by taking logs and derivatives of these equations to obtain
the growth rate of income and consumption per person along a balanced growth path:

\[
\begin{align*}
g_c^{alloc} &= \left( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \frac{\eta}{1-\eta} \right) g_L \quad \text{for } alloc \in \{ sp, c, f \} \\
g_c^{os} &= \left( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \right) g_L.
\end{align*}
\]

Even though this is a semi-endogenous growth setup in which standard policies have
level effects but not growth effects, we see that data use is different. Allocations in
which data is used broadly feature faster long-run rates of economic growth.

The nature of data use matters for all of these results related to the degree of increas-
ing returns to scale in equations (80) to (86), whether in levels or in growth rates. If
every firm sells to 10 others, then this mimics the “outlaw selling” equilibrium because
the number of firms benefiting from the data does not grow with the economy. Con-
versely, if all firms sell their data to one quarter of the other firms, then this economy
features the additional scale effect: the number of firms benefiting from data increases
as the economy grows larger.

In an economy in which firms do not sell data, firms learn only from their own
production. Because the entry cost is a fixed number of units of labor, the number
of firms is directly proportional to the amount of labor in the economy. But this is
just another way of saying that firm size is invariant to the overall population of the
economy: a bigger economy has more firms but not larger firms. This means that in the outlaw-sales economy, there is no additional data benefit to having a larger economy. Contrast this with an economy in which data is used more broadly. In that case, the amount of data that each firm can learn from is an increasing function of the size of the economy. Therefore, the scale of the economy and the increasing returns associated with the nonrivalry of data interact.5

**Data and Firm Production.** This difference in the returns to scale shows up throughout the allocations. This can be seen, for example, in the comparisons of data used by each firm and aggregate data use:

\[
D_{it}^{\text{alloc}} = [\nu_{\text{alloc}}(1 - \alpha)\tilde{x}_{\text{alloc}}\psi_{\text{alloc}}L_t]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad \text{for} \; \text{alloc} \in \{sp, c, f\} \tag{87}
\]

\[
D_{it}^{\text{os}} = [\nu_{\text{os}}\alpha x_{\text{os}}]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \tag{88}
\]

and

\[
D_{i}^{\text{alloc}} = ND_i = [\nu_{\text{alloc}}(1 - \alpha)\tilde{x}_{\text{alloc}}]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}(\psi_{\text{alloc}}L_t)^{1+\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad \text{for} \; \text{alloc} \in \{sp, c, f\} \tag{89}
\]

\[
D_{i}^{\text{os}} = [\nu_{\text{os}}\alpha x_{\text{os}}]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \psi_{\text{os}}L_t. \tag{90}
\]

The scale difference also shows up in firm production. While firm size measured by employment is invariant to the size of the economy, firm production is not invariant when data is used broadly. In that case, firm production grows with the overall size of the economy because of the nonrivalry of data:

\[
Y_{it}^{\text{alloc}} = \left[\nu_{\text{alloc}}(1 - \alpha)^{\eta}x_{\text{alloc}}^{\eta}\psi_{\text{alloc}}L_t^{\eta}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad \text{for} \; \text{alloc} \in \{sp, c, f\} \tag{91}
\]

\[
Y_{it}^{\text{os}} = \left[\nu_{\text{os}}\alpha^{\eta}x_{\text{os}}^{\eta}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}. \tag{92}
\]

**Wages, Profits, and Pricing.** In the equilibrium allocations, i.e., alloc ∈ {c, f, os}, the factor income share of production labor and profits in aggregate output add to one and

---

5 Notice that this finding is robust to specifying the entry cost differently. For example, if the entry cost is such that the number of firms is \(N = L^\beta\), then firm size will be \(\frac{L}{N} = L^{1-\beta}\) and firm data will grow in proportion. Notice that \(\beta\) could be less than one or greater than one: it is possible that firm size is decreasing in the overall scale of the economy if varieties are easy to create. Contrast that with the data sharing case, in which each firm benefits from all data in the economy: \(D_i \propto NY_i \propto N \cdot \frac{L}{N} = L\). That is, regardless of \(\beta\), the full scale effect is passed through.
are given by

\[
\left( \frac{w_t L_p}{Y_t} \right)^{ec} = \left( \frac{w_t L_p}{Y_t} \right)^{os} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta)}, \quad \left( \frac{w_t L_p}{Y_t} \right)^{f} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta \frac{1}{e})}. \tag{93}
\]

\[
\left( \frac{N_t \pi_t}{Y_t} \right)^{ec} = \left( \frac{N_t \pi_t}{Y_t} \right)^{os} = \frac{1 - \sigma \eta}{\sigma(1 - \eta)}, \quad \left( \frac{N_t \pi_t}{Y_t} \right)^{f} = \frac{1 - \sigma \eta \frac{1}{e} - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta \frac{1}{e})}. \tag{94}
\]

By comparison, recall from equation (19) that the aggregate production function for the economy is

\[
Y_t = N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} D_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}} L_p. \tag{95}
\]

Therefore, the marginal product of production labor multiplied by \( L_p \) as a share of aggregate output from the social planner’s perspective is equal to one. That is, as is standard in models with varieties, labor is underpaid relative to its social marginal product so that the economy can provide some profits to incentivize the creation of new varieties.

It is also interesting to compare the monopoly markup and pricing in the different equilibrium allocations. The price of a variety is

\[
q_{it}^{c} = N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = (\psi_c L_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \tag{96}
\]

\[
p_{it}^{c} = \left( 1 + \eta \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta)} \right) N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = \left( 1 + \eta \cdot \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta)} \right) (\psi_c L_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \tag{97}
\]

\[
p_{it}^{f} = N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = (\psi_f L_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \tag{98}
\]

\[
p_{it}^{os} = N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} = (\psi_{os} L_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \tag{99}
\]

Two points are worth noting. First, the effective price paid by consumers (i.e., incorporating the fact that they can sell their data) in the consumers-own-data allocation — \( q_{it}^{c} \) — and the actual price paid by consumers in the other allocations — \( p_{it}^{f}, p_{it}^{os} \) — are both equal to \( N_t^{\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}} \). Of course, \( N_t \) will differ across these allocations, but the point is that the consumer prices are both the same function of the number of firms. Moreover, there is no “markup” term that shows up in this expression. This is a feature of the exogenous labor supply in our environment. One way or the other, labor can only be used to produce goods and so the monopoly markup does not result in a misallocation
of labor. This is true even though firms internalize that they have increasing returns because of the learning-by-doing associated with data.

Second, notice that the price that firms receive for their sales in the consumers-own-data equilibrium, $p^c_{it}$, does involve a markup term given by $1 + \eta \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma(1 - \eta)}$. If $\eta = 0$, this term would drop out. Instead, it captures the fact that firms know that consumers can sell their data. Therefore, firms charge an additional markup over marginal cost to capture this revenue.

The Value of Data. The value of data as a share of GDP is given by

$$\left( \frac{N_t(p_{at}D_{at} + p_{bt}D_{bt})}{Y_t} \right)^c = \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}$$

(100)

$$\left( \frac{N_t(p_{at}Y_{it} + p_{bt}D_{bt})}{Y_t} \right)^f = \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} \cdot \frac{1}{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}.$$  

(101)

We will use these expressions in the numerical examples shortly.  

Efficiency. Comparing the amount of data shared by the planner and consumers, $\tilde{x}$, in equations (64) and (65), it is clear that the monopolistic markup distorts the equilibrium allocation. One might naturally wonder if a production subsidy to correct this distortion would lead the “Consumers Own Data” allocation to be efficient. This turns out not to be true, however. Creative destruction in the equilibrium affects incentives for entrants to introduce new varieties, and this second distortion requires a second instrument. More specifically, let revenue in the firm problem for variety $i$ be increased by $s_y$, and let entry costs be reduced by $s_e$. Then the subsidies that replicate the optimal allocation are

$$1 + s^c_y = \frac{1}{\eta + (1 - \eta) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}}.$$  

(102)

$$1 - s^c_e = \frac{\rho}{gL} \cdot \frac{gL + \delta(\tilde{x}_{sp})}{\rho + \delta(\tilde{x}_{sp})} \cdot \frac{1 - \eta(\sigma + s^c_y)}{1 - \eta}.$$  

(103)

The revenue subsidy, $s^c_y$, is smaller than the conventional markup correction $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}$ because of the presence of $\eta$ and increasing returns. The entry subsidy addresses the

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6When firms own the data, the total value above is the sum of own and purchased data. Since own data is not purchased, we price it at its shadow value $p_{at} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} p_{at}$, driven by perfect substitutability.
fact that firm size and entry are distorted in the equilibrium allocation by creative de-
struction and business stealing; see the discussion above following equation (79). We
know that the “Consumers Own Data” allocation is inefficient. What we see next in our
numerical examples, is that this inefficiency is relatively small.

9 Numerical Examples

We now provide a set of numerical examples to illustrate the forces in the model. This
should not be viewed as a formal calibration that can be compared quantitatively to
facts about the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, we find it useful to think about how large
the various forces in the model might possibly be.

How Large is $\eta$? We have two approaches to gaining insight into the value of $\eta$. First,
from equation (100), in the equilibrium allocation in which consumers own data, the
share of GDP spent on data is given by $\frac{\eta}{1-\eta} \cdot \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}$ (and when firms own data, this formula
provides an excellent approximation to the value of own and purchased data). Taking
a standard value of $\sigma = 4$, this equals $0.75 \cdot \frac{\eta}{1-\eta}$. How important is data as a factor of
production? A casual guess is that it accounts for no more than 5 percent of GDP, which
would imply a value of $\eta = 0.0625$. And 10 percent of GDP seems like a solid upper
bound, implying a value of $\eta = 0.1176$. With this as motivation, we take a benchmark va-

An alternative way to gain insight into $\eta$ is to look at machine learning error rates
and how they change with the quantity of data. Sun, Shrivastava, Singh and Gupta
(2017) study how the error rate in image recognition applications of machine learning
changes with the number of images in the learning sample. They examine four different
approaches with a number of images that ranges from 10 million to 300 million. If we
assume that the error rate is proportional to $M^{-\beta}$ where $M$ is the number of images,
then we can compute an estimate of $\beta$. Using their data, together with a related exercise
from Facebook from Joulin, van der Maaten, Jabri and Vasilache (2015), we obtain 5
different estimates of $\beta$, ranging from 0.033 to 0.143, with a mean of 0.082, as shown in

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7We choose a large value of $\epsilon$ equal to 50, so that $\frac{1}{\epsilon} \approx 1$; plugging this into equation (101) gives the
result.
Figure 1: Estimating $\beta$ from Image Recognition Algorithms

Note: The parameter $\beta$ comes from a model in which the error rate is proportional to $M^{-\beta}$. More specifically, $\beta$ is estimated by regressing the log of the error rate $1 - mAP$ on the log number of images using data from Sun, Shrivastava, Singh and Gupta (2017) in the first three panels and from Joulin, van der Maaten, Jabri and Vasilache (2015) in the last panel. A fifth estimate from Figure 4a of Sun, Shrivastava, Singh and Gupta (2017) with fine tuning is omitted but yields an estimate of $\beta = 0.040$. The data are plotted in blue while the fitted log-linear curve is shown in green.

At this mean value, a doubling of the amount of data leads the error rate to fall by 5.9 percent. Notably, the power function fits well and there is no tendency (at least in the Google study) for the error rate to flatten at a high number of images. Furthermore, as data proliferates, firms will develop new algorithms and applications that make even better use of more data. Posner and Weyl (2018) suggest that this can delay or even offset sharp diminishing returns to data. Obviously, it would be valuable to use a broader set of applications in order to estimate $\eta$ in different contexts; Hestness, Narang, Ardalani, Diamos, Jun, Kianinejad, Patwary, Yang and Zhou (2017) provide estimates ranging from 0.07 to 0.35 for a variety of applications, including speech recognition, language translation, and image classification.

In order to map the estimate of $\beta$ into the parameter $\eta$ in our model, we need...

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[8] We are grateful to Abhinav Shrivastava and Chen Sun for providing the data from their paper and the Facebook paper and for help interpreting the “mAP” metric.
to make some assumption about how the error rate translates into productivity. If productivity equals the inverse of the error rate, then \( \eta = \beta \). However, there is no reason why this assumption needs to hold, and one could imagine that productivity is the error rate raised to some other exponent. Without knowledge of this exponent, we cannot map the estimates from the machine learning literature directly into \( \eta \). Hence, we prefer our earlier approach to calibration based on data’s share of GDP. What we find most valuable about the machine learning evidence is that it supports the power law formulation that is assumed in our model.

**Other parameters.** Other parameter values used in our example are reported in Table 2. We consider an elasticity of substitution of 4 implying that the degree of increasing returns in the economy is \( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} = 0.33 \) when there are no data sales, rising to \( \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} + \eta \frac{1}{1 - \eta} = 0.40 \) when data is used broadly. Population growth in advanced economies is around 1 percent per year, but the growth rate of R&D labor is closer to 4 percent; as a compromise, we choose \( g_{\text{L}} = 0.02 \). Combined with the returns to scale, this implies steady-state growth rates of consumption per person of 0.67 percent when selling data is outlawed and 0.79 percent when data is used broadly. Of course these are lower than what we see in advanced economies, but our model omits other sources of growth, so we probably should not match a higher growth rate. We set \( L_0 = 100 \), corresponding to a workforce of around 100 million people; labor units are therefore millions of people. We set the rate of time preference to 2.5 percent (it must be larger than \( g_{\text{L}} \)). Entry requires \( \chi = 0.01 \) workers; because labor units are in millions of people, this corresponds to 10,000 people, and with an R&D share of the population of around 1 percent, this would mean 100 researchers. We set the weight on own data to \( \alpha = 0.5 \); as long as \( (1 - \alpha) > 0 \), the particular value of this parameter is inconsequential for our results.

The privacy and creative destruction parameters are less standard, so we choose baseline values, but also explore a wide range of values in our numerical exercise. Regarding the privacy cost parameters, \( \kappa \) and \( \bar{\kappa} \), Athey, Catalini and Tucker (2017) show that people express concerns about privacy but are willing to share once incentivized, even by a relatively small reward: a majority of MIT students in their survey were willing to share the email addresses of three close friends in exchange for a free pizza.
Table 2: Parameter Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of data</td>
<td>η</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of substitution (goods)</td>
<td>σ</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight on privacy</td>
<td>κ</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population level</td>
<td>L₀</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>gₙ</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of time preference</td>
<td>ρ</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor cost of entry</td>
<td>χ</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative destruction</td>
<td>δ₀</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight on own data</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of substitution (data)</td>
<td>ϵ</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of own data in OS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Baseline parameter values for the numerical example.

Nevertheless, we give an important role to privacy; an individual’s privacy concerns regarding all their economic activity may be different than that exhibited in the lab. We set $\tilde{\kappa} = 0.20$, implying that having all of one’s data shared with all firms is equivalent to a reduction in consumption of 10 percent; we explore robustness to values between 0.02 and 0.99. Selling all of a variety’s data increases the rate of creative destruction by $\delta₀/2$, which we calibrate to 20 percent; absent any other death, this corresponds to an expected lifetime of 5 years. We explore robustness to values of $\delta₀$ between 0.02 and 0.99.

### 9.1 Consumption-Equivalent Welfare

Consumers care about consumption as well as privacy. A consumption-equivalent welfare measure incorporates both. Along a balanced growth path, welfare is given by

$$U_{ss}^{alloc} = \frac{L₀}{\rho} \left( \log c₀^{alloc} - \frac{\tilde{\kappa}}{2} x_{alloc}^2 + \frac{g_c^{alloc}}{\rho} \right).$$
Notice that the $x_{it}$ “own privacy” term drops out because it is scaled by $1/N$; recall equation (4). Let $U_{ss}^{alloc}(\lambda)$ denote steady-state welfare when we perturb the allocation of consumption by some proportion $\lambda$:

$$U_{ss}^{alloc}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{\rho} \left( \log(\lambda c_{0}^{alloc}) - \frac{\kappa}{2} x_{t}^{alloc} + \frac{g_{c}^{alloc}}{\rho} \right).$$

Then consumption equivalent welfare $\lambda^{alloc}$ is the proportion by which consumption must be decreased in the optimal allocation to deliver the same welfare as in some other allocation:

$$U_{ss}^{sp}(\lambda^{alloc}) = U_{ss}^{alloc}(1).$$

Moreover, it is straightforward to see that this consumption equivalent welfare measure is given by

$$\log \lambda^{alloc} = \log \frac{c_{0}^{alloc}}{c_{sp}} - \frac{\tilde{\kappa}}{2} \left( \frac{x^{2}_{alloc}}{x^{2}_{sp}} \right) + \frac{g_{c}^{alloc} - g_{sp}}{\rho}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (104)

That is, there is an additive decomposition of consumption-equivalent welfare into terms reflecting differences in the level of consumption, the extent of privacy, and the growth rate.

### 9.2 Quantitative Analysis of Welfare and Property Rights

In this section we compare consumption-equivalent welfare for the consumers-own-data and firms-own-data property right regimes. The parameters that we have the most uncertainty over are $\delta_{0}$, $\kappa$, and $\tilde{\kappa}$, so we hold all other parameters at the baseline calibration and explore the behavior of the model across a wide range values for these parameters. In the next section, we study the allocations in detail for a particular set of parameter values.

Figure 2 shows the ratio of consumption-equivalent welfares, $\lambda^{c}/\lambda^{f}$, for various combinations of $\eta$, $\delta_{0}$, and $\tilde{\kappa} = \kappa$. When this ratio is less than one — the red triangular region in the plots — the “Firms Own Data” allocation is superior. In the majority of the plot, however, this ratio is larger than one, indicating that the “Consumers Own Data”
allocation is generally superior. In fact the result is even stronger. When $\eta = 0.06$, the smallest this ratio gets is 0.998. Moreover, across the three plots (for different values of $\eta$), the lowest value this ratio ever reaches is 0.993. In other words, even in the relatively rare instances that the “Firms Own Data” allocation generates higher welfare, it does so by only a small amount. But when the “Consumers Own Data” allocation is superior, it typically generates substantially higher welfare.

The theory can help us understand the parameter combinations for which the “Firms Own Data” allocation is better. Recall that when consumers own data, they typically sell a bit less than is socially optimal, so that $\tilde{x}^c < \tilde{x}^{sp}$; the reason is that the markup in the economy means that firms generally value data less than the planner, so the equilibrium price of data is inefficiently low. In contrast, the amount of data that firms sell broadly, $\tilde{x}^f$, depends on the creative destruction parameter $\delta_0$. As shown in equation (66), the lower is this parameter, the higher is $\tilde{x}^f$. So by choosing the parameter appropriately, the “Firms Own Data” allocation can generate a value of $\tilde{x}^f$ that is close to $\tilde{x}^{sp}$. This is what we see in Figure 2: for the right low values of $\delta_0$, the “Firms Own Data” allocation is superior. Of course, as this parameter falls further, this raises $\tilde{x}^f$, and it eventually leads to $\tilde{x}^f >> \tilde{x}^{sp}$: if creative destruction is not a problem for firms, they will sell even more data than the planner desires. In this case, the “Firms Own Data” allocation becomes inferior once again. This general logic explains why there is a range of values for $\delta_0$, on the low end, where firms owning data is better.\footnote{This is also related to the bulge in the left side of the red region in the $\eta = 0.12$ plot in Figure 2. In that region, the firm would like to sell even more than 100% of its data: unconstrained by technology, it would choose $\tilde{x}^f > 1$.}

To summarize, this sensitivity analysis that explores model behavior across the parameter space suggests that the “Consumers Own Data” allocation typically generates substantially higher welfare. It is only when the creative destruction force is very weak and privacy concerns are very large that the “Firms Own Data” policy can be slightly better.

9.3 The Baseline Numerical Example

Now that we understand that welfare is generally higher when consumers own data, we explore allocations across property-right regimes in more detail for our baseline parameterization to understand the sources of the welfare differences. The top panel
Table 3: Numerical Example

### Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Data Use</th>
<th>Firm size</th>
<th>Variety</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Creative Destr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“own”</td>
<td>“others”</td>
<td>$N/L = \psi$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Planner</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers Own Data</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms Own Data</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlaw Sales</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Consumption-Equivalent Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Welfare $\lambda$</th>
<th>log $\lambda$</th>
<th>Level term</th>
<th>Privacy term</th>
<th>Growth term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optimal Allocation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers Own Data</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.0128</td>
<td>0.0080</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms Own Data</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.1078</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlaw Sales</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>-0.927</td>
<td>-0.7037</td>
<td>0.0319</td>
<td>-0.2553</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports statistics from our numerical example for the different allocations using the parameter values in Table 2. The top panel shows baseline statistics along a balanced growth path. Firm size is multiplied by $10^6$ and therefore is measured in people. The bottom panel reports consumption equivalent welfare calculated according to equation (104). In particular, $\lambda$ is the fraction by which consumption must be decreased in the optimal allocation to deliver the same welfare as in some alternative allocation.
Note: The plots show the ratio of consumption-equivalent welfare, $\lambda^c / \lambda^f$, for various combinations of $\eta$, $\delta_0$, and $\tilde{\kappa} = \kappa$. When this ratio is larger than one — which holds for most parameter combinations — the “Consumers Own Data” allocation is superior. When this ratio is less than one — the red triangular region in the plots — the “Firms Own Data” allocation is superior. The smallest and average values of $\lambda^c / \lambda^f$ in each plot are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\eta$</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.03</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.06</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.12</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A black circle in each figure shows our benchmark calibration.

of Table 3 shows summary statistics for key variables. The fraction of data that is used broadly differs dramatically across the allocations. The social planner chooses to share
56 percent of data, even taking privacy considerations into account. When consumers own data, they sell less at 49 percent.10 As discussed earlier, the reason for this difference is the monopoly markup \( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} = 1.33 \) that leads the price at which consumers sell their data to be too low relative to what the planner would want. These “high use” allocations can be contrasted with the bottom two allocations. When firms own data, they distort the use of data in two ways. First, they use 100 percent of their own data, more than what consumers or the planner would desire. In this sense, firms do not satisfy the privacy concerns of consumers. Second, there is too little sharing with other firms relative to the planner: firms sell only 13 percent of their data to other firms. The key factor in this decision is creative destruction. And of course, when selling data is outlawed, the allocation features no data sales.

The next two columns of the top panel show that firm size and the number of varieties differ across the allocations. When firms own data or when selling is outlawed, the rate of creative destruction is low (see the last column). Less creative destruction has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it raises the present value of profits, which tends to promote entry. On the other hand, it reduces the boost to entry associated with business stealing. When \( \rho > g_L \) the business stealing effect dominates and higher rates of creative destruction lead to more entry and smaller firms. This can be seen in the top panel of Table 3, where the number of varieties is higher when consumers own data than in the two limited-sales allocations. Similarly, firm size is smaller when consumers own data.

The outlaw-sales equilibrium features a smaller scale effect, which shows up both in economic growth being slower and in the overall level of consumption being substantially lower.

The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the welfare decomposition using the baseline parameter values. The allocation in which data selling is outlawed is stunningly inferior: consumption-equivalent welfare is only 40 percent of that of the social planner. A small part of this is the growth rate differential, but the bulk comes from distortions to the level of consumption, most importantly the missing scale effect associated with broad data use. Laws that prohibit data sales can have dramatic effects, reducing incomes substantially.

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10In the planner and consumers-own-data allocations \( x = \bar{x} \) because we’ve set \( \kappa = \bar{\kappa} \) and \( \alpha = 1/2 \).
One institution that appropriately balances these concerns is assigning ownership of data to consumers. Data use is close to that of the social planner and consumption-equivalent welfare falls just short of optimal in this example. Consumers take their own privacy considerations into account but are incentivized by markets to sell their data broadly to a range of firms, leading them to nearly-optimal allocations.

In contrast, when firms own data, concerns about creative destruction sharply limit the amount of data they sell to other firms. While limited sharing generates some privacy benefits, equal to about 3 percent of consumption, the social loss from nonrival data not being used by other firms is much larger. Of course, the way we've modeled privacy is ad hoc, as privacy considerations are not the main focus of the paper. However, our baseline parameterization of $\tilde{\kappa}$ was intentionally set to deliver large utility costs from lack of privacy, and still the welfare losses are dominated by the use of data in production.

Equilibrium welfare is just 93% of optimal when firms own data, compared to 99+% of optimal when consumers own data. Failing to appropriately take advantage of the nonrivalry of data leads consumption to be lower by more than seven percent along the balanced growth path, even in this example in which there are sharply diminishing returns to additional data.

10 Discussion

Implications for IO. Several issues related to antitrust and IO are raised by this framework. First, because firms see increasing returns to scale associated with data and, perhaps more importantly, because of the nonrivalry of data, firms in this economy would like to merge into a single economy-wide firm. Our paper provides a concept of a firm as the boundary of data usage and the nonrivalry of data may create strong pressures to increase scale. Return to the example of medical data being used within hospital networks to improve the accuracy of diagnoses. If hospitals merged, they would be able to estimate a more accurate algorithm, leading to better service on this dimension for all of its patients. This suggests data policy and antitrust policy may best be designed jointly.

Second, data may serve as a barrier to entry. A natural concern about the limited-
sales allocations is that as a firm accumulates data, this may make it harder for other firms to enter. In our framework, this force appears somewhat mechanically through the dependence of the rate of creative destruction \( \delta(\tilde{x}) \) on the amount of data sold. It would be interesting in future research to consider this force more explicitly, say, in a quality ladder model.

Third, if data were produced both as a byproduct of consumption and as the result of active firm investment, then optimal property rights could be different. For example, think of Waymo driving cars in an artificial town. If Waymo offers taxi rides or if Waymo’s probability of being destroyed depends on Tesla data, then consumer sales of such data could increase creative destruction. In this case, broader use of data might lead firms to invest too little in generating data.

**The Boundaries of Data Diffusion: Firms and Countries.** At the beginning of the paper, we noted that both ideas and data are nonrival. Both can be expressed as bit strings, and it is natural to wonder about the differences between them. For example, while ideas give rise to increasing returns and people create ideas, growth theory does not typically suggest that Luxembourg and Hong Kong should be much poorer than Germany and China because of their relatively small size. Instead, the view is that ideas diffuse across countries, at least eventually and in general, so that the relevant scale is the scale of the global market of connected countries rather than that of any individual economy.

Data may be different. For example, it seems much easier to monitor and limit the spread of data than to limit the spread of ideas. Perhaps this is because ideas, in order to be useful, need to be embodied inside people in the form of human capital (which makes it inherently hard to keep it from spreading). In contrast, data can be encrypted and tightly controlled.

This raises an interesting question about whether the quantity of data that an organization has access to can serve as an important productivity advantage. This could apply to firms or even to countries. For example, the Chinese economy is large. Could access to the inherently larger quantities of data associated with a large population provide an advantage. Lee (2018) suggests “China has more data than the US — way more. Data is what makes AI go. A very good scientist with a ton of data will beat
a super scientist with a modest amount of data.” Similarly, a population with less concern for privacy or a government that places a lower weight on consumer privacy might induce more data sales, leading to a higher level of aggregate output (but perhaps lower welfare). State-owned enterprises could be encouraged to share data with each other. Or, in an industry context with trade, this difference could lead to firms (e.g., in China) having a distinct productivity advantage in data-intensive products.

11 Conclusion

The economics of data raises many important questions. Privacy concerns have appropriately received a great deal of attention recently. Our framework supports this: when firms own data, they may overuse it and not adequately respect consumer privacy.

But another important consideration arises from the nonrivalry of data. Because data is infinitely usable, there are large social gains to allocations in which the same data is used by multiple firms simultaneously. Consider our own profession. There are clearly substantial benefits in having data from the PSID, the CPS, and the National Income and Product Accounts available for all to use. At the heart of these gains is the fact that data is nonrival. It is technologically feasible for medical data to be widely used by health researchers and for all driving data to be used by every machine learning algorithm. Yet when firms own such data, they may be reluctant to sell it because of concerns over creative destruction. Our numerical examples suggest that the welfare costs arising from limits to using nonrival data can be large.

Government restrictions that, out of a concern for privacy, outlaw selling data entirely may be particularly harmful. Instead, our analysis indicates that giving data property rights to consumers can lead to allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data to all interested parties. This raises interesting design problems related to overcoming transaction costs that might overwhelm consumers. Our analysis shows that the value of solving these problems, perhaps via intermediaries and technological innovations, may be large.
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